

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE  
NASHVILLE DIVISION**

ADAMS & BOYLE, P.C., on behalf of itself and  
its patients; *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

HERBERT H. SLATERY III, Attorney General of  
Tennessee, in his official capacity; *et al.*,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 3:15-cv-00705

JUDGE FRIEDMAN

MAGISTRATE JUDGE  
FRENSLEY

**MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’  
MOTION FOR A STAY PENDING APPEAL**

Plaintiffs (“the Providers”) respectfully submit this memorandum in opposition to Defendants’ (“the State”) motion (D.E. 246) for a stay of this Court’s April 17, 2020 Order (D.E. 244) (the “Order”), which preliminarily enjoined Tennessee Executive Order 25 (“EO-25”) as applied to procedural abortions.

**I. The State Fails to Properly Apply the Test for Stay of a Preliminary Injunction**

The State’s attempts to re-litigate issues carefully considered and decided by this Court should be rejected. The factors considered when resolving a motion to stay injunctive relief pending appeal are substantially the same as those governing whether to grant injunctive relief in the first place. *See Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm*, 473 F.3d 237, 244 (6th Cir. 2006). The party requesting the stay bears the “heavy” burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion in its favor. *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 433-34 (2009) (citations omitted); *Ohio State Conference of N.A.A.C.P. v. Husted*, 769 F.3d 385, 389 (6th Cir. 2014).

The State completely ignores the third prong of the test, “whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding.” *Hilton v. Braunskill*, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987). As this Court correctly found, after EO-25 took effect and until this Court’s grant of injunctive relief, abortions after 11 weeks from a woman’s last menstrual period (“LMP”), and abortions at any point in pregnancy for women for whom a medication abortion is contraindicated, were unavailable in Tennessee. Order at 8-9. The Providers were forced to cancel procedural abortions to avoid risking criminal and other penalties. *Id.* at 8. The Court’s Order has made it possible for patients who were initially turned away to obtain vital, time sensitive care. *See* Declaration of DeeDee Chism (detailing the significant harms she experienced after EO-25 took effect, and how she will now be able to access essential care in her own state), attached as Exhibit A. Granting the State’s stay motion would reinstate the irreparable harms to patients this Court relied on in preliminarily enjoining EO-25.

**II. The State Has Not Made a Strong Showing That They are Likely to Succeed on the Merits of Their Appeal**

Even assuming *Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts*, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) is relevant, this Court’s Order is entirely consistent with the limitations on police power recognized in that decision. First, the State argues that under *Jacobson* it has the power to enact quarantine laws and health laws of every description “*even where those laws may curtail constitutional rights.*” State’s Br. at 2 (emphasis added). But that is a mischaracterization of the Supreme Court’s ruling in *Jacobson*. There, the Court was clear that “even if based on the acknowledged police powers of a state, [a rule] must always yield in case of conflict with . . . any right which [the Constitution] gives or secures.” 197 U.S. at 25. Rather than holding that federal courts are powerless to intercede in such circumstances, the Court deemed it its “duty to hold such laws invalid.” *Id.* at 28. Likewise, this Court correctly exercised its duty by enjoining EO-25 as applied

to procedural abortion, based on its finding that EO-25 violates a fundamental right that has been clearly established for decades. *See* Order at 8-9 (citing *Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Baird*, 438 F.3d 595, 602 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he fundamental right to privacy contained in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to choose to have an abortion . . . prior to viability, without undue interference from the State.”) (quotation marks omitted).

Second, the State wrongly asserts that *Jacobson* prohibits “judicial second-guessing of the state’s public health measures.” State’s Br. at 2. On the contrary, consistent with this Court’s decision, the State’s emergency police power is subject to judicial review and must actually serve the State’s asserted interest. *Jacobson*, 197 U.S. at 28, 31. Here, the record shows that EO-25 does not advance, but rather frustrates, its stated purpose of conserving personal protective equipment (“PPE”) and reducing transmission of COVID-19. As this Court found, the Providers “have implemented sanitation procedures, as well as procedures to minimize the use of PPE”; “they do not use N95 masks or other hospital resources needed to respond to COVID-19”; “procedural abortion[s] use[] less PPE and involve[] significantly less patient interaction than carrying a pregnancy to term and giving birth;” and forcing women to travel out of state to access abortion will lead to greater risk of infection. Order at 11. The State does not address this evidence and indeed cannot contest it. *Id.* (“Defendants have presented no evidence that any appreciable amount of PPE would actually be preserved if EO-25 is applied to procedural abortions.”).

Finally, the State argues that no other court has granted similar relief. State’s Br. at 2. That is incorrect. As this Court noted in its opinion, every court presented with this issue has granted a temporary restraining order. *See* Order at 8 n.3.

**III. The State Has Failed to Demonstrate Irreparable Harm and the Balance of Harms and Public Interest Weigh in Favor of the Plaintiffs**

The State will not be irreparably harmed by the denial of a stay, nor does the balance of harms or public interest counsel in favor of a stay, as this Court has already found. Order at 10-11. The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly declined to grant motions to stay injunctive relief, including in case law cited by the State, where, as here, the plaintiff and/or public would face substantial harm. *See, e.g., Graveline v. Johnson*, 747 F. App'x 408, 412 (6th Cir. 2018) (denying stay where plaintiffs would face “substantial harm” because candidate’s name would not appear on ballot and voter plaintiffs would be unable to vote for him); *Ohio State Conference of N.A.A.C.P. v. Husted*, 769 F.3d 385, 389–90 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding stay would cause significant public harm by causing confusion and suppressing voter turnout).

**CONCLUSION**

For the foregoing reasons, the State’s motion for a stay pending appeal should be denied.

Dated: April 20, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing *Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal* has been served on the following counsel of record through the Electronic Filing System on this 20th day of April, 2020:

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