Introduction

As modern technology spawns new surveillance methods, new legal concerns are emerging as well. One such controversial technology is geofencing, which came under scrutiny in the recent U.S. Supreme Court case Chatrie v. U.S. Geofencing allows tech companies and law enforcement to determine who was near an area of interest using cell phone location data—a potential violation of constitutional rights.

The Center for Reproductive Rights takes notice whenever sensitive data fuels legal action. Geolocation data itself, like that at issue in Chatrie, could be used to target people seeking or providing abortion. We already know that data brokers sell geolocation data that specifically implicates reproductive health. We also know that geofences have been used to target patients for anti-abortion ads. It’s not a far leap to see the frightening potential of location data for pregnancy criminalization.

The Court’s ruling in Chatrie, therefore, has major implications for reproductive rights.

Case background

Case background

Chatrie v. U.S. revolves around the constitutionality of geofence warrants, which require third-party vendors to comb users’ digital location data within a virtual area and report that information back to law enforcement. Eight states have taken steps to prohibit geofences around health facilities, though Virginia, where the case originates, has not.

The plaintiff, Mr. Chatrie, was arrested for his alleged role in a Virginia bank robbery after a geofencing dragnet identified him as being in the area of the crime. A lower court found there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a short span of location data voluntarily exposed to a third party (in this case Google). On this basis, it ruled that no search had occurred. The Supreme Court took the case specifically to determine whether the police’s use of Chatrie’s location data violated the Fourth Amendment, which protects against unreasonable searches.

SCOTUS ruling

Supreme Court ruling

Mr. Chatrie’s lawyers argued that sensitive data (in this case location data) accessible only with an account and password are entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Constitution. The Department of Justice countered that it is individuals who are responsible for ensuring that their data sharing settings are not overly permissive. Writing for a 6-3 Court majority, Justice Kagan sided with Chatrie on June 29, 2026. She was joined by Justices Sotomayer, Jackson, Roberts, and Kavanaugh, stating that “an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell-phone location information.” Justice Gorsuch concurred, using a more “originalist” legal test.

The Court established a limiting principle: this holding applies only to cell phone location information that is “not truly shared,” meaning one normally doesn’t want a third party to see or use it. For example, a personal to-do list on your phone that contains location data is more likely to be considered “not truly shared,” as opposed to location data that you send to a friend, which may be viewed as intentionally shared. Practically, this principle means that even though you may agree to a third party’s terms and conditions, that doesn’t automatically override your privacy rights.

Chatrie’s holding matters because it applies traditional Constitutional protections to modern surveillance technologies. As Kagan writes, “That data[source] is new, but the principle covering it is not.” Considering the number of third-party applications on any given individual’s smartphone, and the rapid pace of technologic development, the guardrails enshrined in this ruling are significant.

Abortion implications

Abortion implications

In their dissent, Justices Alito, Thomas, and Barrett claimed that the data span at issue here (two hours’ worth) is too brief for a search to have happened. They opine that little can be gleaned from someone’s personal life based on short-term movements. But that doesn’t hold true for abortion. As the majority opinion acknowledges, being at an abortion facility for any amount of time—certainly two hours—reveals something deeply personal.

During oral arguments in Chatrie, Justice Kagan worried aloud that the greenlighting of geofence warrants could be used to target abortion facilities. It is significant that Kagan wrote the majority opinion in this case, because she wrote it with reproductive health privacy in mind. That’s exactly what the post-Dobbs moment demands: an abortion-first legal framework.

Next steps

Next steps

Procedurally, this case is not resolved. The Court decided only that a geofencing warrant is a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment—it could not agree whether the search in question was unconstitutional. Now, a lower court must determine the warrant’s reasonableness. It’s possible that the case will come back to the Supreme Court to concretely resolve the question of constitutionality.

No matter Chatrie’s ultimate posture, the U.S. government has a responsibility to enact and implement clear, uniform, modern privacy standards for all reproductive health data, not just cell phone location data. These safeguards must consider current and forthcoming technological realities, as well as the criminalization of pregnancy post-Dobbs. States are leading the way, with technology-specific limitations (like geofence bans around healthcare facilities), comprehensive shield laws, and broad consumer privacy protections. These critical policies minimize the sharing of sensitive data that could be weaponized against patients.

Takeaways

Takeaways

Geofencing searches can, and will, continue, so long as the warrants they are based on contain the particularity and probable cause that is constitutionally required. Additionally, there are troves of reproductive health data that can still be shared without a warrant, for example through the data broker loophole. Still, Chatrie places critical obstacles in the way of reproductive surveillance.

As digital vendors and their users increasingly become custodians of sensitive health data, including data implicating abortion care, legal frameworks must keep pace. The general public expects that its sensitive information will remain private. At least in this instance, the law supports that reasonable expectation. Amid a series of regressive rulings, that’s cause for celebration.